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SOME CRITICAL
SOCIAL WELFARE

-

QUESTIONS IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
THE CARTER "WELFARE REFORM" PROPOSALS

By L. K. Northwood
Professor of Social Work
University of Washington
The purpose of this paper is to discuss President Carter's welfare
reform proposals, appropriately titled, "The Program for Better
If these proposals are adopted by Congress,
Jobs and Income."
they will guide the Administration in its stance toward and its
work with the lowest income sectors of the nation: the welfare
poor--those who cannot work and must be supported by the government, and the working poor--those who are able to support themselves, but whose yearly income is less than the poverty level.
Consequently, the paper starts with an analysis of what the government documents have to tell us about the scope and nature of
poverty in the United States. Then we proceed with a discussion
of the current welfare reform proposals--what the Administration
intends to do about the persistent entrenched poverty that plagues
the nation. Finally, we ask: will the Carter welfare reforms
work? We return to the key question posed at the beginning of the
Is it possible for the federal government to institute
paper:
reforms that will result in better jobs and better distribution of
income so that the welfare poor and the working poor can maintain
a standard of living above abject poverty?
The content of the Carter proposals is constantly being modified:
the August 6th version is different from the May 2nd. HEW Secretary Joseph Califano, Jr. , has invited "in-depth consultation,
. . . to see how our plan should be further developed and refined."

He acknowledges "that Washington, D.C. is not the final repository
of wisdom ind we do not have all the answers, nor even all the
questions."
In short, now is the time for social policy analysts and social
critics to prepare for the national debate that is bound to ensue
during the coming months.
The General Approach of the Carter Administration to Welfare Reform
In June of this year, the Bureau of the Census issued two comprehensive reports: "Money Income in 1975 of Families and Persons in
the United States," and "Characteristics of the Population Below
the Poverty Level: 1975." At approximately the same time, President Carter announced his proposals for "welfare reform," more
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appropriately subtitled "The Program for Better Jobs and Income"
in the text of his report.
The census documents, in part, provide the factual and historical
data required for an assessment of the relevance of the Carter
proposals.
Basically what the census documents contain is good
sound information pertaining to two sensitive indicators of the
effectiveness of economic and social organization in the United
States:
whether it sustains a large impoverished social class,
and whether it distributes income and other resources with equity
and equality.
The central question to be answered is:
Is it
federal government to institute reforms that will
jobs and better distribution of income so that
and the working poor can maintain a standard
abject poverty?

possible for the
result in better
the welfare poor
of living above

The facts of poverty. The fact of the matter is that in 1975
there were 25.9 million persons living below the poverty level of
$5,500 for a nonfarm family of four. This comprised about 12 percent of the entire population.
The poverty level is a statistical concept developed by the Social
Security Administration in 1964 that has come to have profound
implications for administrative decision-making. For example, it
is used to determine who will receive certain welfare benefits.
The poverty index is based on the economy food plan, the least
costly of four nutritionally sound food plans, designed by the
Department of Agriculture. It provides a range of income cutoffs
adjusted by such factors as family size, sex of the family head,
number of children under 18 years old, and farm-nonfarm residence.
Those who are living below the poverty threshold are experiencing
"absolute poverty."
The report highlights the current situation in 1975 for those
living in absolute poverty, and presents the trends since 1959 in
the following words and numbers:
There were 25.9 million persons below the poverty level in
1975, comprising 12 percent of all persons. Between 1974 and
1975, the number of persons below the low-income level increased by 2.5 million or 10.7 percent, reflecting the continued inflation and sluggishness in the economy. For example, during this period the poverty thresholds increased
9.1 percent, reflecting the changes in consumer prices,
whereas personal income per capita increased only 7.5 percent. In addition, the average annual unemployment rate rose
from 5.6 percent to 8.5 percent, and the number of persons
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who exhausted their unemployment benefits increased from
2.0 million in 1974 to 4.3 million in 1975. The increase of
2.5 million low-income persons during the 1974-1975 period
was the largest single year increase observed since 1959, the
first year for which poverty data were available . . .
Between 1974 and 1975, the increase in the number of persons
below the poverty level was quite pervasive, occurring for
both Black and White persons, for persons of Spanish origin,
and for the young as well as the elderly. Particularly large
percentage increases were observed or Whites, persons under
65 years, and husband-wife families.
There have been substantial changes over time in the size of the
population living below the poverty level.
During the early
1960s, from 1959 to 1966, the number and percent of persons living
in absolute poverty declined from a high of 39.5 million, or
22.2 percent, to a low of 25.3 million or 12.4 percent. This led
many at that time to believe that the War on Poverty had been won.
Unfortunately, however, since 1968 there has been little change in
the numbers or the proportions: about 25 million persons, 12 percent of the total population, remain in absolute poverty.
Furthermore, it has now become evident that while changes may be
effected in "absolute poverty" as measured by the number and
percent of persons below the poverty threshold, very little has
really been accomplished to further income equality in the nation;
that is, very little has been done to effect the "relative poverty."
This is perhaps the single most striking finding of the Bureau of
the Census report on "Money Income in 1975 of Families and Persons
in the United States."
Despite the War on Poverty and other
governmental efforts of the past decades, there has been no general
reduction in income inequality from 1947 to 1975.
Using the simplest measure of income distribution--the share of
annual income received by portions of the population ranked by
income--the lowest 20 percent of the population has never varied
from a 3 to 4 percent share, while the highest 20 percent has
always received about 44 percent. In 1975, the income for the
highest fifth was $31,466 per year, about seven times the annual
income of the lowest fifth, $4,514. These figures are not averages--they represent the upper limits of income for the fifth.
The historical trends presented in these two census monographs add
up to a single hard fact about the nature of the American economy.
It is an economy that sustains income inequality and absolute
poverty for millions of persons. The low-income fifth contains

-540-

about 5.6 million families and 9.4 million unrelated persons with
annual incomes of less than $4,514 in 1975 and mean incomes of
less than $3,000 per year. About half of this income derives from
earnings, the balance from government transfer payments and property.
Tqose in absolute poverty experience even a less-favored
status.
The economic conditions which produced this situation in 1975 have
persisted essentially since the termination of World War II. The
economy of the United States apparently is unable to reduce income
inequality or absolute poverty to an acceptable level without
substantial restructuring of the economy. This should have profound implications for the Carter Program for Better Jobs and
Income.
The Theory of the Fluidity of Poverty
Instead, the Carter administration apparently is pursuing another
line of reasoning based on another set of facts about the nature
of poverty. This can be called the theory of the fluidity of
poverty. The theory, and Carter's policy, is based on the premise
that there is a "hard core" of poor people, perhaps 6 or 7 million,
who should, and must, be supported by the government, but that the
majority of the nation's poor, perhaps 7.5 to 10 million people,
are able to move out of absolute poverty if they are provided with
appropriate government assistance to do so.
This theory is stated clearly by Joseph Califano, Jr., Secretary
of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the leading
spokesman for the Carter administration on the issue of welfare
reform, as follows:
We have to face the fact in this country, unless we want to
defy the laws of all recorded history, that there will be
some poor people always.
There are going to be people that are utterly incapable of
taking care of themselves, You know, blind people that are
seriously disabled will need some kind of help. There are
going to be small children who have the misfortune of being
put in families, being born into families or non-families,
where there is no one to take care of them. Either we can
write them off and say we are not going to take care of them,
or we can, as we have as a civilized society since the New
Deal, take care of those children.
If we looked at the
numbers

. . . (at the) . . . irreducible three percent .

.

(there are) . . . still . . . six or seven million people
that will need help from somebody.
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(However), this country is not full of people that have been
sitting on welfare for three generations. That is a really
pernicious--I use the word advisedly--myth. Let me take the
opportunity of pointing out how fluid this population is.
Each year, 7.5 to 10 million people move above the poverty
line in this country, and a like number unfortunately become
poor. The one study we have done, which is from 1967 to
1972, (shows that) only three percent of the American population was poor in every one of those six years. It is still a
large number of people. And I realize that. But the other
side of it is (that) more than 20 percent--actually 21 percent of the people who were poor--of the American population
was poor at least in every one of these years.
So while the poverty percentage in this country hovered at
11 percent, about a quarter of the population at risk in any
given year during that 6-year period, people moved in and out
of poverty. In every one of those years, 30 to 40 percent of
the poor in one year were not poor in the next succeeding
year. So people can move, and they can move out of poverty.
The Carter administration theory of the fluidity of poverty follows clsoely the Brookings Institution analysis of income security
policy by John L. Palmer and Joseph J. Minarik. Palmer and Minarik
hold that the major reductions in absolute poverty in the period
of 1959 to 1975 were caused by a combination of "strong economic
growth during the 1960s and the increased ant poverty effectiveness of public transfers in the last decade."
By public transfers they refer to government cash programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Supplemental Security Income
(SSI), Social Security, Unemployment Compensation, and other
programs, as well as the "in kind" transfers such as Food Stamps
(FS), Medicaid/Medicare, Child Nutrition, and Housing Assistance.
For example, Palmer and Minarik cite government studies indicating
that in 1972, 85 percent of the total food stamp bonuses, 74 percent of public housing benefits, and 75 percent of Medicaid expenditure were receivgd by those whose pretransfer incomes were below
the poverty level.
The transfer programs are less effective with certain groups than
with others. For example, cash transfers were far less effective
in helping the poor in male-headed families with children than
they were for the aged. Moreover, according to Palmer and Minarik,
the effectiveness of transfer payments in removing female-headed
families from poverty has not increased since 1959, in contrast to
their increasing effectiveness for other demographic groups.
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The importance of government transfer payments to
families is clearly shown in Table 1.

low-income

TABLE 1
Percent Distribution of Aggregate "Money Income"
For Families and Unrelated Individuals by Poverty Status in 1975
(Numbers in Thousands)

Above Poverty Level

Below Poverty Level

Families

Unrelated
Individuals

Families

Unrelated
Individuals

$16,882

$8,319

$3,100

$1,573

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

EARNINGS

85.5

72.3

41.5

22.3

OTHER THAN EARNINGS

14.5

27.7

58.4

77.7

Government
Transfer Payments

7.1

13.5

52.7

70.3

Dividends,
Interest, Rent

4.2

8.2

1.8

3.9

Pensions,
Annuities, Alimony

3.2

6.0

3.9

3.5

Type of Income

Mean Income
(Dollars)
Total

Source:

U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-60,
No. 106, "Characteristics of the Population Below the Poverty Level:
1975," U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1977,
pp. 154, 156, 159, 161.

Table 1 indicates that over 70 percent of the aggregate "money
income" of unrelated individuals and almost 53 percent of the
aggregate money income of families living below the poverty level
derived from government transfer payments in 1975. In contrast,
small proportions--7.1 percent and 13.5 percent--gomes from this
source for families and individuals above poverty.
Several low-income categories rely more on welfare
their aggregate income than others, as for example:

checks

for

Percent of income received
from transfer payments

2,430,000 families with a female head

65.9

1,513,000 black families

60.5

728,000 families with head 65 and over
2,125,000 individuals 65 and over

89.0
93.3

A more detailed analysis of the source and types of income appears
in the Census Report on "Money Income in 1975 of Families and
Persons in the U.S."
It shows that most families depend on income
from both earnings and property, 63.4 percent, whereas smaller
proportions rely on either their earnings only (24.6 percent) or
nonearned income (11.8 percent).
As the family becomes more affluent, the importance of earnings
and property combined predominates. About 1 percent of the income
of persons in the upper-income fifth is not earned; 18.8 percent
comes from earnings alone, and 80 percent from earnings and property investment.
In fact, it is evident that wealth is more
unequally distributed than annual income in the United States. In
1972, 32.5 million or slightly under one-fifth of the population
of the United States owned corporate stock. The wealthiest 1 percent owned 61 percent of all corporate stock, real estate, cash,
bonds, 8 insurance, equity, pension-fund reserves, and personal
trusts.
In contrast, the poor owe more than they own. Families in the
lowest-income fifth are much like the families below the poverty
level. About half (46.1 percent) of the families in this category
are dependent on government transfer payments and pensions for
their livelihood.
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Table 2 is a 100-percent chart showing the amount of income by its
source for all families with less than the median family income of
$13,719 in 1975. The horizontal axis identifies the amount of the
family income at each thousand-dollar level. The vertical axis
divides the chart into decile ui~ts indicating the proportion of
income allocated to each source.
For example, of all the families with less than an income of $2,000 in 1975, 28 percent was
derived from earnings only, 34 percent from earnings and other
income than earnings only, 17 percent from other income from
nonearned sources, and 21 percent from Social Security and/or
public assistance only, or both.
From an inspection of the chart, it is apparent that families
having incomes of more than $8,000 get very little of this from
transfer payments. It is unlikely that this situation will change
in the future, even if the Carter "welfare reform" proposals are
enacted into law. As will be seen, an $8,400 ceiling is placed on
cash transfer payments under the Carter proposals. It should be
noted, however, that the income figures in the chart do not include
nonmoney transfers such as food stamps, health benefits, and
subsidized housing, as well as other forms of nonmoney income such
as rent-free housing, goods produced and consumed on farms, the
use of business transportation and facilities, capital gains, and
other benefits.
The importance of transfer income in alleviating absolute poverty
is also indicated by an analysis of trends in federal government
expenditures. For example, payments to individuals (in cash and
kind) and grants to state and local governments to administer some
of these programs rose from $12.1 billion in 1955 to $167.4 billion in 1967. This comprised 3.2 percent of the nonrecession
gross national product in 1955 and 8.4 percent in 1977. According
to Charles L. Schultze:
Developments in three major types of program explain almost
nine-tenths of the growth in the ratio of domestic federal
expenditures to GNP between 1955 and 1977. (1) The rapid
expansion of retirement, disability, and unemployment compensation was responsible for slightly more than half the
growth. (2) The introduction of new low-income assistance
programs providing food, medical, and housing benefits to the
poor, and subsequent increase in both these benefits and the
older cash welfare payments, accounted for 14 percent of the
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growth. (3) The introduction and the rapid expansion, especially between 1965 and 1970, of new social growth and social
investmn0 t programs contributed about 18 percent of the

growth.
As will be seen later in the paper, the Carter "welfare reform"
proposals are designed at least in part to put a tight lid on
these zooming federal expenditures.
Conclusion
There can be no denying that government transfer payments contribute much to the livelihood of the poor. They constitute probably
a good half of the annual income of most low-income families and
individuals. However, given the recorded experience of the last
two decades, there is no sound body of evidence as yet in support
of the theory of the fluidity of poverty, given the present level
and distribution of transfer payments, and given the present
uncertain economic conditions:
high unemployment, high underemployment, relatively low wages for selected occupations and
geographic areas, widespread and uncontrolled inflation, and a
regressive tax system.
Furthermore, there are many obstacles, dilemmas, and contradictions which must be solved to make the transfer strategy work.
The Carter 'welfare reform" is an attempt to solve these problems,
to transform government transfer payments into an escalator out of
absolute poverty for the welfare poor and the working poor. In
the sections that follow, we will deal with each of the major
proposals and show its relevance to the preceding analysis.
The Carter Welfare Reform Proposals
President Carter's Program for Better Jobs and Income has emerged
gradually during the first 8 months of his administration.
If some reluctance and tentativeness has been shown by the Administration in addressing the task, that is understandable because
welfare reform has been the submerged reef on which many presidential administrations have floundered. HEW Secretary Joseph Califano
calls welfare reform "the Middle East of domestic politics" with
just cause.
The first version of the program was introduced in a televised
message to the nation by President Carter on May 2nd. Subsequently, on May 24, HEW Secretary Califano issued a "tentative
working draft" of two "major program initiatives--a jobs program
to reach low-income Americans and a consolidated cash assistance
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structure that, at a minimum, replaces the Aid to Families of
Dependent Children, Supplementary Security Income, and Food Stamp
programs."
Finally on August 6, as Congress adjourned for its
summer recess, the finished product was submitted for Congressional consideration.
The President emphasized the need for welfare reform in the following words:
In May after 4 months of study, I said that the welfare
system was worse than I expected. Each program has a high
purpose and serves many needy people, but taken as a whole
the system is neither rational nor fair. The welfare system
is anti-work, anti-family, inequitable in iff treatment of
the poor, and wasteful of taxpayers' dollars.
He underscored his earlier conclusion of May 2nd that:
The most important unanimous conslusion is that the present
welfare progfams should be scrapped and a totally new system
implemented.
What is the "present welfare system" that President Carter intends
to scrap? The components are clearly identified in the Administration's proposals.
First of all, it should be noted that these proposals cover only a
small portion of the welfare system as it is presently constituted.
Social welfare expenditures ! fiscal 1976 consumed $331.4 billion
in national budget outlays.
This figure includes all the cash
benefits, services, and administrative costs for all programs
operating under public law that are of direct benefit to individuals and families. The programs included are those for income
maintenance through social insurance programs and public aid, and
the public provision of health, education, housing, and other
welfare programs, i.e., what are usually considered as public
social welfare expenditures.
In contrast, the scheduled reform under the Carter proposals will
replace $26.3 billion in current programs that provide income
assistance to low-income people. The programs and their cost to
the federal government in 1978 dollars are listed below:
AFDC

$6.4 billion

SSI

$5.7 billion

Food Stamps

$5.0 billion
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Earned Income Tax Credit

$1.3 billion

Stimulus Portion of CETA Public Jobs

$5.5 billion

WIN Program

$0.4 billion

Extended Unemployment Insurance Benefits
(27-39 weeks)

$0.7 billion

Rebates of per capita share of Wellhead Tax

15

Revenue to Low-Income People if Passed by Congress

$1.3 billion

Total

$26.3 billion

In addition to these expenditures, the program will produce savings
in other related programs amounting to $1.6 billion. This includes
savings in: decreased unemployment insurance expenditures, $0.4 billion; HEW program to reduce fraud and abuse, $0.4 billion; decrease
in required housing subsidies due to increased income, $0.5 billion;
increases in Social Security contributions, $0.3 billion.
It is evident that the part of the welfare system scheduled for
reform is that which provides income assistance to low-income
people, namely those affected most directly by government transfer
payments.
Also, it is these income security transfer programs
which have had such a phenomenal growth since 1960.
According to Palmer and Minarik, the income security transfers
have risen from 24 percent 016 the federal budget in 1960 to an
estimated 42 percent in 1977.
The total federal expenditure in
1977 is estimated to be $183.0 billion.
Furthermore, income security expenditures have the potential for
dramatic expansion.
While the present enrollment of families
eligible for AFDC is estimated at 90 percent and little growth is
expected in this program, the same cannot be said about the food,
housing, and health programs. Only about 50 percent of those
eligible to receive food stamps actually participate in the program. Less than 15 percent of the low-income poor entitled under
the law since 1968 to home ownership and rental assistance have
received it because of limited appropriations.
Medical costs
continue to spiral upward. Continuing high rates of unemployment
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and inflation contribute to the problem. In short, the cost of
income transfer programs is an ever-increasing part of the feceral
budget.
It is about this fact of life that President Carter refers when he
says:
In my May 2 statement I established as a goal that the new
reformed system involve no higher initial cost than the
present system. It was my belief that fundamental reform was
possible within the confines of current expenditures if the
system were made more rational and efficient. That belief
has been borne out in our planning. Thereafter, Secretary
Califano outlined a tentative no-c? t plan which embodies the
major reform we have been seeking.
The President wants to keep the lid on welfare spending--a difficult task. For he frankly acknowledges that the new programs will
have a total cost of $30.7 billion, which A $2.8 billion in
spending above the costs of existing programs.
In addition, he
reports that an additional $3.3 billion in tax relief may be given
to working low- and moderate-income taxpayers through an expanded
income tax credit.
Thus the total costs of Carter's welfare reform proposals may well
be close to $35 billion rather than the lesser estimates. Even
so, this does not constitute all the welfare reform anticipated by
the Administration. Later in the year there will be presidential
proposals for tax refgm legislation and restructuring of the
Social Security system.
What the President is saying is that there will be little additional cost now, initially, for my welfare reform package, but it
is designed to prevent any great expansion in welfare spending for
the poor in the immediate future.
Controlling the growth of federal spending and reassessing the
feceral government's role in society were two of the major themes
in the 1976 election campaign. These are the central concerns of
the Carter welfare reform proposals.
How does he plan to do this? How will welfare reform "transform
the manner in which the federal government deals with the income
needs of the poor, and begin to break the welfare cycle?" In this
paragraph and the ones that follow, the words in quotes are the
direct statements of the President.
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A four-point strategy is proposed:
1.

Reduce the number on welfare by introducing "tougher" standard
rules for eT-gibility.

First of all, work is a mandatory precondition for many groups if
they are to receive government income support. "All two-parent
families, single people, childless couples, and single parents
with no child under 14, are expected to work full-time and required to accept available work. Single parents with children
aged 7 to 14 will be required to accept part-time work which does
not interfere with caring for children, and will be expected 8
accept full-time work where appropriate day care is available.
Only those who cannot work--the aged, sick, blind, disabled, and
single-parent family heads with children under 7--are exempted.
Thus the proposed program initiative would clearly establish a
two-tier system of welfare recipients: (1) the upper e vned-income
supplement tier, and (2) the lower income-support tier.
"The upper tier benefit level for a family of four will be $4,200
in 1978, approximately 65 percent of the poverty threshold and
exceeding the bonus value of food stamps plus the federal share of
AFDC in all but two states. The national basic benefit for aged,
blind, or disabled couples and individuals exceeds the current
federal SSI benefits plus the bonus value of food stamps. The
Administration's proposal extends federal cash assistance for the
first time to single individuals and childless couples, and establishes national basic benefit levels that would be nearly 50 percent higher than the bonus value of food stamps.
Benefits on the lower tier are designed to preserve an incentive
to work. The benefit will augment the earnings of the working
poor, provide cash assistance while families and individuals
search for jobs, and provide a level of income protection for
children if a parent refuses to work. The proposal calls for an
8-week period of job search with a cash assistance of $2,300 for a
family of four, followed by an increased benefit of $4,200 if no
job is available. Benefits will be reduced after the first $3,800
of earnings by 50 cents for each dollar. A four-person family
ceases to be eligible for benefits at an income of $8,400.
A wage earner in all families with children on the lower tier will
be required to work. In two-parent families, the wage earner with
the longest experience will be required to work. The latter
provision will obviously discriminate against the woman in
two-parent families where both parents desire to work, if government services are provided only for the male head.
-551-

The institution of a mandatory work requirement drastically modifies the principle that "all citizens are entitled and shoul
regard themselves as entitled to receive an adequate income."
In particular, it would alter the primary goal of the Aid to
Families of Dependent Children program:
that of strengthening
family life.
It would deny that all mothers have a right to
income support to enable them to take care of their children
themselves and should not have to go to work. Although selfsupport has also been an acknowledged goal of the program since
revisions in 1962, little has heen done hitherto to implement this
requirement administratively.
To be sure, there are mitigating
aspects to the Administration's proposal for AFDC mothers, as
indicated above. However, the proposal does away with income as a
right and makes it contingent upon willingness to work.
The imposition of a work requirement is not the only change in the
rules of eligibility proposed in the reform package. Changes are
also required: (1) in who may apply for benefits (filing unit);
(2) in the "countable income" or income that counts in determining
eligibility; (3) in assessing standard assets "to assure that
people with substantial assets, such as a bank account," do not
receive a benefit; (4) in the nature of the accounting period; and
(5) in the system for filing regular income reports. The Administration views these changes as essential because at present
procedures vary greatly among the states and between the programs
to be incorporated in welfare reform. The adoption of uniform
rules will allow for decentralized administration of the vast
program among the states while maintaining federal standards. It
will also significantly reduce the number of beneficiaries of the
program.
For example, the proposed change in filing unit would discourage
two nuclear families on welfare from living in the same household
by denying benefits to one of the families. Single persons who
are not aged, blind, or disabled may apply separately for benefits
only if they are living alone or with nonrelatives. The benefits
of aged, blind, and disabled persons will be substantially reduced
if they live in the household of another and do not bear a pro rata
share of the household's expenses. Students who live away from
home may not apply separately for benefits if they are claimed as
dependents for federal income tax purposes.
The Administration proposes a change to "retrospective accountable
periods."
Present programs use prospective periods of varying
lengths (3 months in SSI, 1 month in AFDC and food stamps) for
determining need. An applicant's entitlement is determined by
anticipating income.
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The Administration's proposal will measure income retrospectively,
using an applicant's actual income over the preceding 6 months.
The Administration offers several weighty reasons for the change:
that it would prevent families with relatively high but irregular
incomes from receiving benefits; that it would help avoid the
problem of overpayments; that it would prevent manipulating income
and welfare through sporadic work efforts.
On the other hand, a shorter accounting period is more responsive
to emergency and sporadic needs. Furthermore, shorter accounting
periods have the effect of redistributing assistance to a larger
population. The assumption of savings implied by longer accounting periods has not been proven in real family situations.
There is abundant evidence in the census reports and other government sources that employment for many low-income workers is sporadic, and that they are likely to work on jobs which are unprotected by unemployment insurance. Lengthening the waitinP4 period for
government assistance would be just one more hardship.
It is difficult to assess the number of persons that would be
affected by a change in the rules for eligibility. A variety of
studies document how welfare authorities can constrain the choice
of potential users of welfare by imposing a work requirement and
can lower the value of assistance by making its receipt distasteful.
All of these show that a change in rules and25 regulations can be
effective for limiting the population served.
What they do not
show very well is that they can motivate people to go to work.
That is the second of the Carter strategies for welfare reform
2.

Transform the
possible.

welfare poor

into the working poor whenever

Not a single person is guaranteed a steady job at decent pay under
the provisions of the President's Program for Better Jobs and
Income, with the exception of those who administer the program.
However, it promises that "a new effort" will be made by "state
and local officials . . . to match low-income persons with available work in the private and public sector, . . . to assure an
unbroken sequence of employment andraining services, including
job search, training, and placement."
In essence, job opportunities are to be provided to welfare recipients, primarily to AFDC mothers and other low-income persons.
This is the way that President Carter proposes "restoration of the
work ethic in our country":
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Dramatically reduce reliance on welfare payments by doubling
the number of single-parent family heads who support their
Combine
families primarily through earnings from work.
effective work requirements and strong work incentives with
improved private sector placement services, and create up to
1.4 million public service jobs. Forty-two percent of those
jobs may be taken by current AFDC recipients. Those who can
work will work, and every family with a full-time worker will
have an income substantially above the poverty line.
The proposed program stresses private sector employment. President
Carter emphasized the principle that "incentives will always
encourage full-time and part-time private sector employment." A
fiscal reason is given for this by President Carter:
It is obvious that the more jobs that are made available by
private industry and public regular employment and in public
service jobs and training jobs, the less cash supplement will
be needed.
When private sector employment is unavailable, "public training
and employment should be provided." The public service jobs will
be full-time and will pay the minimum wage. Training stipends
will equal about 85 percent of wages from a full-time minimum wage
job.
In general, state and local agencies will be responsible for the
employment placement process and the public job and training
programs under the supervision of the Department of Labor. Local
administration of public jobs programs is one of the Carter principles for welfare reform.
The incentives for work include the following: "(a) Those whose
family sitautions are such that they are deemed 'expected to work'
are given a lower level of cash benefits if they do not work or if
they refuse an appropriate job that has been offered. (b) Cash
benefit payments are reduced for those who are earning income, but
not by so much that work fails to be worthwhile. (c) The Earned
Income Tax Credit will increase the financial rewards of work in
regular employment compared with public service employment, by
being made inapplicable to earnings from public service employment.
(d) To help all single-parent families with children under 14 with
the special work expense of child care, a deduction from income
for child care penses will be allowed in calculating the family's
cash benefits."
By providing these inducements President Carter hopes to transform
the welfare poor into the working poor. The proposal is somewhat
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fuzzy about the exact number of jobs that will be required, and
the census data on poverty are not organized in a way that accurate estimates can be made. However, the data do indicate that
almost 60 percent of the families below the poverty level had one
or more persons working during 1975.
Almost half of the
male-headed families and a quarter of the female-headed families
worked full time for below poverty-level incomes, and a large
proportion worked part time. Families with male heads averaged
37 weeks of work during the year, while for female head and
unrelated individuals the average was 29 weeks during 1975.
If
the work experience of people living below the poverty level is
similar to those receiving welfare payments, it would seem that
there is no lack of work motivation on their part.
While the census data are such that hard conclusions cannot be
drawn, there are a number of excellent research studies on the
subject. In particular, the work and welfare patterns of AFDC
families can be pinpointed rather accurately. One review summarizes the research findings as follows:
The turnover in the welfare population is high. Estimates of
the average number of months spent continuously (spells) on
AFDC vary from under 2 years to over 3 years, reflecting
regional variation. The length of spells on AFDC are associated with differences in family structure and labor-market
experience. Male-headed families and families with a head
who has a good chance of becoming employed are more likely
than female-headed families and families of limited employability to leave welfare. Whites, those with higher nonwage
income, and those with better labor-market opportunities, all
have better prospects of leaving welfare. Once off welfare,
nonwhites and those whose expected wage is below the legal
minimum are more likely to return to welfare. Over the long
term, changes in annual family income are rather small for
most units in the low-income population, including AFDC
families. Therefore, most low-income families remain at risk
for long periods. Unemployment or other small changes frequently result in their return to welfare.
The picture that one gets of life opportunity below the poverty
level is that it offers a choice between temporary low-paying jobs
or welfare, and little else.
The research studies also indicate that variations in the welfare
administrative structure also is of cricual importance in determining welfare experience over time. Families are more likely to
remain on welfare the more generous the welfare program they face.
Generosity may take the form of high guarantees, low tax rates, or
lenient administration.
While reemployment, the return of an
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absent male head to the family, or toughened administration may
result in short-term success, i.e., the removal of families from
welfare dependency, such success will often be temporary.
3.

The Carter reform plans to standardize welfare benefits and
"ensure" that work will alwas be more profitabe than welfare,
and that a private or nonsubsidized-public job will always be
more profitable than a special federally funded service job."
This is the third strategy for welfare reform.

Not only is there great variation currently in the welfare benefits among the states, but in some states it is possible to have
more income on welfare than 3Oy working full time. President
Carter cites several examples:
*Current combined state and federal AFDC benefits for a family
of four with no income vary from $720 per year in Mississippi
to $5,954 in Hawaii.
*In Wisconsin, if a father quits his full-time job at an
income of $5,691 (after taxes, tax credits, and food stamps)
and took a half-time job at the same wage scale, his income
would jump to $6,940 on welfare.
*In Michigan, a family of four with the father working full
time at minimum wage has a total income of $5,678. The
same-sized family, without the father in the home with still
four people there, not working at all, has an income of
$7,161.
If the mother goes to work at minimum wage, the
family has a total income of $9,530.
The solution proposed is to:
(1) consolidate the three major
welfare programs serving the poor (AFDC, SSI, Food Stamps) and
replace them with a single system of cash assistance; (2) standardize the rules for eligibility among the 50 states; (3) establish
a national basic benefit for all welfare recipients; (4) encourage
states to add to or supplement the national basic benefit; (5) enforce the minimum wage provisions during the process of job placement.
Where unsubsidized jobs are found in the regular economy, they
must pay at least the federal minimum wage or the state rate, if
it is higher. Placement on jobs in the new Public Service Employment Program is "carefully designed to avoid disruptive effects on
the regular economy," and "the basic wage rate will be kept at,,,T
where states supplement, slightly above the minimum wage.
Thirteen major categories of public service jobs are identified
including: aiding the elderly and the sick, providing childcare,
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paraprofessionals in the schools, improving public safety, building and repairing recreational facilities, cleaning up neighborhoods and controlling insects and rodents, monitoring environmental quality, weatherizing homes to save energy, and others.
In one sense the Carter proposals represent a well-organized
campaign under federal auspices to downgrade the standard of
living of the welfare poor, for it is likely that the standard of
living will be altered downward for those fortunate families of
the welfare poor whose government checks now supply them with a
higher annual income than the working poor. In order to enhance
the work incentive, their income will have to be reduced below
that of the working poor.
Moreover, trade union members and
professional groups may view the Carter proposals as a threat to
their employment, for a large pool of low-paid government workers
will be created if the Carter proposals are adopted--even if that
is not their intent. The public service jobs are clearly identified as one-year placements, essentially for the purpose of training, and are open only to unemployed applicants who must have
spent at least 5 weeks in prior search for an unsubsidized job in
the regular economy. Moreover, the public jobs are restricted to
work not currently being done by local and state governments.
However, there is so much work of the nature described as appropriate to subsidized employment that requires doing, and is not being
done now, that a great pressure will be created on local governments to apply for the federal subsidy. Sponsorship of public job
programs will not be limited to governmental auspice, but may
include other nonprofit organizations as well.
This will increase
the demand.
Finally, the proposal states that usubsidized jobs will be used
only as a last resfft for those who cannot find regular nonsubsidized employment."
Many local communities have already passed
the "last resort"; they are in fiscal crisis with high levels of
persistent unemployment. This is apparent to the Carter administration, for one of the major goals of the welfare reform is "to
give significet financial relief to hard-pressed state and local
governments."
4.

Streamlining the administration of welfare programs is the
fourth part of the Administrationrs strategy of welfare
reform. To be successful, the willing and active cooperation
of state and local governments is needed, for public assistance has been a shared responsibility for the past 40 years.
In giving relief to "hard-pressed state and local governments," the federal government paves the way for compliance
and cooperation. Administrative procedures and standards may

ultimately be established at the federal level, but they must
be implemented at the local level. It is at that level that
the consumer of welfare benefits becomes a part of the system.
Many of the proposals for strealining administration of welfare
programs have already been discussed elsewhere in the article.
However, President Carter has stated three additional objectives
which seem relevant to administrative practice for their success.
The are:
Reduce fraud and error, and accelerate efforts to assure that
deserting fathers meet their obligations to their families.
Provide strong incentives to keep families together rather
than tear them apart, by offering the dignity of useful work
to family heads and by ending rules which prohibit assistance
when the father of the family remains in the household.
Provide increased 4nefits and more sensitive treatment to
those most in need.
The extent of deliberate fraud on the part of the recipient has
always been minimized by the Administration in its discussions of
welfare reform. According to President Carter, it is "the complexity of currt programs (that) leads to waste, fraud, red tape,
and errors."
Secretary Califano amplifies the point:
"As I indicated when we went through the HEW reorganization,
there is substantial error rate in these programs. We revealed that the error rate in Medicaid was running about 9 or
10 percent, meaning that 9 or 10 of every $100 we were spending was being spent on ineligible people, not necessarily
because there were thieves out there, but because we were
making a lot of mistakes--and the complications of the current administrative structure makes a lot of mistakes inevitable."
By consolidating the current programs into a single cash program,
and by establishing uniform rules of eligibility among the states
and local units, the Administration believes that it can reduce
fraud and error.
Its estimate of savings in the reduction of
fraud and abuse, if the new system is implemented, is $0.4 billion, little more than 1 percent of the cost of the program.
While much is said in the proposals about the desirability of
keeping families together, the context is largely that of fiscal
economy rather than the provision of social services directed
toward this end. To be sure, subsidies for childcare will be made
available to mothers of young children who are required to work as
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a precondition for government assistance. However, is this a
program for keeping families together or keeping families apart?
Even less attention is devoted by the Administration to specific
proposals to "provide increased benefits and more sensitive treatment to those in need."
Sensitive treatment implies the provision
of an adequate program of social services.
But social services
are mentioned only as a byproduct of the public services employment program. They would be performed largely by untrained personnel in programs in which the structure guarantees a complete
turnover each year. It should be remembered that social services
(job counseling, training, day care, rehabilitation, and personal
services) are critical to an income maintenance system which deals
with people on a basis of their availability for work.
To be sure, the Administration is now aware of the excessive
amount of paperwork that flows through the welfare system and that
is a barrier to sensitive treatment of the consumer. Secretary
Califano cited an exhibit of the State of California where the
welfare recipients have to fill out "7 feet of forms." "Incredible!" he exclaimed. "It is that kind of an unbelievable morass
that we 3ave leveled on the American taxpayer and the American
people."
The streamlining of the administration of social welfare will be a
complicated and time-consuming process. If only for this reason,
welfare reforms, if adopted by Congress, will not go into effect
until 1981.
Will the Carter Welfare Reform Work?
There is an addiction to euphemism in the White House. Whereas
President Johnson proclaimed to the nation over a decade ago that
he (the Administration) would "win" the War On Poverty, now President Carter, in softer accent, makes a similar declaration for
:welfare reform":
In 1981, this program will provide for families with children
and one parent able to work:
(a) a total minimum income
20 percent above the 1981 poverty line if a job in the regular
economy can be found; or (b) a total income 13 percent above
the 1981 poverty line if a subsidized job must be provided.
To accomplish this pledge will require more in the way of a revolution than there appears to be in the welfare reform proposals of
the Carter administration.
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At the beginning of this article we posed the key question:
Is it
possible for the federal government to institute reforms that will
result in better jobs and better distribution of income so that
the welfare poor and the working poor can maintain a standard
above abject poverty?
The Administration's answer to this question is partially in
misleading and optimistic estimates such as those cited above, and
partially in a realistic set of procedures aimed at establishing
tight controls over runaway welfare expenditures. If these procedures are instituted and made to work, experience tells us that by
1981 conditions at least as bad and probably worse will prevail in
the nation.
They will be the conditions reported in the 1975
census reports:
25 to 40 million welfare and working poor with
the lowest-income fifth receiving less than 4 percent of the
aggregate income of the nation.
President Carter's pledge to solve the problems of poverty is
based on the contingency:
"if a job in the regular economy can be
found."
This contingency is not underlined in the quote above.
Nor does it receive appropriite attention in his proposals for
welfare reform.
Instead it is stressed that public employment
will be offered, but "as a last resort," that "incentives will
always encourage . . . private sector employment," that the program is "carefully designed to avoid disruptive effects on the
regular economy."
Thus the Administration is placing its faith in the theory of the
fluidity of poverty. The nation will take care of the "hard core"
welfare poor--the aged, sick, blind, disabled, and the mothers of
preschoolers. But millions of others below the poverty level will
have only "a new effort by state and local officials" to prepare
and help them find "job opportunities."
Not a single person is
guaranteed a job except at minimum pay for a short period of time
in the Public Service Employment Program.
There is not enough in the President's proposal either to achieve
better jobs or a decent income for people in poverty. In fact,
the phrase, "a decent income for those who cannot work" disappears
from the final version of the proposal, although it was identified
as one of the major goals in the original. The federal government
promises only a national basic income benefit of up to 65 percent
of the poverty threshold for its favored upper tier of subsidized
worker-families, and the balance is up to the beneficence of state
and local governments--which are already suffering a fiscal crunch.
All the poor, favored and unfavored, are left with is an opportunity for better jobs if they can be found in the regular economy.
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On the other hand, there are some good things and some bad things
in the proposals for the reform of welfare administration, if
arrangements can be worked out with Congress and the 50 states.
Among the good things are the consolidation of allied welfare
programs, the transformation of benefits into cash benefits, and
some of the procedures to make management more efficient and
effective.
Among the bad things are the many restrictions that
would reduce the eligibility of poor people for government aid:
subsistence income would no longer be the right of all needy
mothers of dependent children, but a privilege to be conferred
upon the few who are not required to work.
One set of difficult-to-enforce eligibility criteria is substituted for another set of difficult-to-enforce criteria. A critical problem in this respect is the difficulty of determination of
the willingness to work. Friedman and Hausman state the issue
succinctly:
As a practical matter, work tests are unlikely to operate so
easily, since much unemployment is involuntary, resulting
from labor-market conditions beyond the control of the worker.
In addition, some workers have characteristics that employers
do not want, making it especially difficult for them to get
jobs.
Thus work tests cannot require actual work effort of
all; they can only demand some sort of evidence that the
unemployed worker is seeking a job actively. The actual work
requirement can be applied only once a job is available.
Prior to that point, work tests usually are work registration
requirements requiring only work search on the part of the
registrant. However, a test of job search rather than a
straightforward requirement of work opens opportunities for
evasion. It is not necessarily a success for a work test to
return a person to work; that would probably happen anyway.
The critical test induces a person into a job more quickly
than he would go on his own. Since voluntary unemployment is
largely a matter of timing, it is not obvious that a work
test will succeed . . . Thus although a work test seems like
an obvious device to increase work effort, careful investigation J? required to determine whether this is actually the
case.
Major social policies such as welfare reform should be based on
the findings of empirical research whenever possible, rather than
on strictly political considerations.
There is little certain
evidence that the extensive research on the work and welfare
patterns of low-income families has been considered adequately.
In contrast, the proposals seem to ignore even the obvious findings of the Bureau of the Census on the persistence and intransi-
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gence of poverty, which occurs despite the evidence of widespread
work experience among the poor.
Apparently Congress is not waiting for the Carter welfare reform
proposals before taking action of its own. In fact, hearings are
presently being conducted which would effect many of the changes
that are included in the Carter proposals. However, not all of
the proposals are beneficent in character.
Commerce Secretary
Juanita Kreps calls for the withholding of Social Security benefits until recipients reach 68, which runs counter to the present
provision of benefits at the ages of 62 and 65. She believes this
is necessary to restore Social Security to financial health:
actuaries have predicted that the first of several Social Security
funds will go dry in fiscal year 1979.
This evoked a strong
protest from HEW Secretary Califano:
I absolutely don't agree with that. I think the Older Americans of this country have worked for years, 30, 40, and some
of them 50 years, and we have promised them that at age 65
there'll be Social Security benefits to help then 3V have a
comfortable and dignified life as senior citizens."
According to the analysis presented above, the Administration has
failed to provide a federal solution to the income and full employment needs of the poor. Does this mean that this is an impossible
task for the government to achieve?
The position of the author is that it is not!
An economy capable of generating a gross national product in
excess of $1.5 trillion is one that should be able to provide an
estimated before-tax income for a family of four of $17,912, or
almost $18,000.
This is based on statistical calculations from
the Department of Commerce by Pamela Roby. She concludes:
"In
other words, if income were distributed equally or even nearly
equally
gthe United States, not one family or individual would
be poor.
Whether income is distributed according to a work requirement or
free of it is another question. Certainly there is a backlog of
unfulfilled material, cultural, and service needs that are required
in the nation that would benefit all of its citizenry, not just
the poor. The planning and accomplishment of this work would use
millions of workers. And if it seemed that the work was about to
run out, then the work week might be shortened, with the dollar
savings from this given to the workers or the citizenry at large.
Such a plan does not demand either public ownership of the means
of production or that work be performed under public auspices,
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provided that the owners of the means of production and the citizenry are willing to empower their government to institute the
plan.
Such a proposal, of course, seems Utopian under present conditions
in the United States. However, anything less than this is unlikely
to accomplish the goal of better jobs and decent living standards
advocated in the Carter proposals.
Some less radical solutions are also available if the will to
implement them exists. For example, the federal government expenditures in fiscal 1977 will amount to about $452.0 billion, about a
quarter of the gross national product. There should be ways to
allocate government expenditures in the future other than about
$1.5 trillion for social wpljare and almost $1.0 trillion for
defense in the next 5 years.
It is ironic that the interest on
the national debt is estimated at $40.3 billion for fiscal 1977,
as compared with the estimated $35.0 billion for the costs of the
Carter welfare reforms.
One source of funds suggested by the Administration to pay for the
costs of welfare reform was the rebate of per capita shares of the
Wellhead Tax Revenue to low-income people under the National
Energy Plan. It is estimated that this would produce an estimated
$1.3 billion in fiscal 1978.
This transfer procedure suggests others which also should be
supported. Congresswoman Holtzman in 1976 and Congressman Mitchell
in 1977 proposed transfer amendments to the Congressional Budgeting
Committee which, if passed by Congress, would have relocated about
$10.0 billion from the development of new weapons systems and
other military expenditures to a variety of social progras such
as those suggested in the Carter proposals. They would also have
provided relief to state and local governments to meet the work
and training needs of the unemployed. Such transfer amendments
should be supported.
A minimal plan to accomplish welfare reform would be the support
of bills already in the legislative hopper, such as the HumphreyHawkins bill for full employment, the Harrington Youth Employment
Act, and many bills that call for an upward revision of the minimum wage. Welfare reform probably will come in incremental steps
rather than at one fell swoop. And there will be intense struggles
every step of the way.
All that is required is the willingness of the citizenry, translated into pressure on Congress to do their part. Of course,
given the present lack of imagination and inertia that character-563-

izes the administrative and legislative wings of the government,
as well as the structural barriers that hinder reform, it will
nevertheless take concentrated effort by an organized public to
make government fly.
In the interests of the working poor and the welfare poor, we must
The
ask for a better effort from the Carter administration.
pernicious consequences of widespread increasing poverty and
unemployment demand a more imperative implementation of the timetable than 1981, which is that proposed for welfare reform.
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